










cost analysis  (BCA) has come  to be a pillar of  the national  transport policy because of subsequent 




BCA  in Sweden for transport  infrastructure  investment, and considers design  issues that have been 
and still are debated, such as whether the discount rate should include a risk term and how to account 
for  the marginal  cost of public  funds. A main  concern with BCA  results  is  the underestimation of 
construction costs, making transport sector projects look better than they are. Several ex post analyses 
have established that a higher NPV ratio increases the probability of being included in the investment 
program proposal prepared by  the agency. The requirement  to  let projects undergo BCA seems  to 
make planners  “trim” project proposals by  trying  to  reduce  investment  costs without  significantly 
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Beginning as a planning  tool within  the national  road administration  in  the 1970s, BCA has a  long 
tradition  in  the planning of Sweden’s  transport  infrastructure and has gradually become a pillar of 
national  transport  policies  for  road  and  railway  projects.  Two  parliamentary  decisions  were 
instrumental for this. The Transport Policy Act of 1979 established that marginal  instead of average 
cost  should be  the overarching basis  for  the pricing of  transport, and  the 1988 Act  separated  rail 













results  are  covered  by  the  Public  Access  to  Information  and  Secrecy  Act  (SFS  2009:400).  This 
contributes  to  transparency,  informing  the  public,  and  facilitating  communication with  interested 
parties.  
Where  possible,  the  Swedish  practices  are  benchmarked  to  the  common  European  practices  and 
standards such as the recommendations made by European Commission (2014) and HEATCO (2006). 
No upgrading of airports  is being, or has recently been, considered, and  improvements  in maritime 








aspects  of  estimating  benefit  and  cost  components  while  section  5  reviews  studies  that  have 
considered the impact of BCA on actual priorities. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background 



















The  1958  road  construction  program  was  prepared  by  a  committee  with  experts  from  the  road 
administration,  giving  road  engineers  a  strong  influence  over  priorities.  Sweden’s  National  Road 
                                                            
1 Wallström and Söderqvist (2016) give an overview of BCA studies of environmental regulations by a number 
of government agencies. The most recent guidelines for assessments of environmental regulations are found in 











In  1988,  SJ was  vertically  split,  at  that  time  into  an  Infrastructure Manager  (Banverket)  and  one 
operator  that  kept  the name  SJ.  The  separation had  its origin  in both  the  trends  that have been 
described, i.e. the annual need for parliament to allocate subsidies to the loss‐making railways, and 
the  fact  that  road  use  generates  external  effects.  Severing  the  railway  monopolist  meant  that 
infrastructure,  the  part with obvious  scale  economies, had  to be  subsidized up‐front while  traffic 
operations were supposed to cover their own costs. Therefore, the source of deficits became clear. 








railways.  In  1993  the  government  established  another  agency,  SIKA  (Statens  Institut  för 
KommunikationsAnalys),  in  charge  of  “making  traffic  forecast,  planning  models  and  cost‐benefit 
assessments of the development of the transport system” (Govt. Directive 1993). One purpose was to 
avoid  the  situation  in  which  the  road  and  rail  administrations,  in  their  competition  for  national 
investment  funds, would  strategically  select  forecasts and parameters  that would  favor  their own 
mode. From 2010 forward, this potential modal conflict was eliminated by a merger of Vägverket and 
Banverket  into  the  Swedish  Transport  Administration  (Trafikverket),  which  then  took  over  the 
responsibility for maintaining and developing the respective BCA models. Starting in 2012, it updates 
                                                            
2 Software linked to traffic forecasting model, called EVA, was developed in the 1990s and has continuously 











the establishment of the causal consequences of  interventions. The  latter  includes estimating time 
savings, the impact on the number of accidents of the choice between different road designs, and the 









no  low‐budget alternative  is available,  leaving  the decision maker with no other option  to  solve a 
pressing  problem  than  a  gold‐plated  alternative.5  To  avoid  these  pitfalls,  the  construction  of 
alternatives for the analysis must be transparent.  
The starting point  for policy  interventions  in  the  transport sector  is  the  identification of  roads and 
railways  that have capacity or  safety problems and  the availability of means  that are available  for 
resolving  shortcomings. Over many  years,  a  four‐step  principle  has  been  developed  as  a  generic 
checklist  for  systematically  considering  alternative  means  for  addressing  challenges.  Today  it  is 
standard text in the government’s and the parliament’s formal decisions.  Consider… 
                                                            
3 SIKA coordinated four sequential revisions of the BCA protocols, (Jansson 1995, SIKA 1999, SIKA 2002, 
SIKA 2008). Trafikverket’s protocol is published on the following link: http://www.trafikverket.se/for-dig-i-
branschen/Planera-och-utreda/Planerings--och-analysmetoder/Samhallsekonomisk-analys-och-
trafikanalys/gallande-forutsattningar-och-indata/. An English summary is available on the link provided. 
4 An important addition to the literature is real option theory (Dixit and Pindyck 1994), but it has so far not had 
very much influence on infrastructure planning practices (Krüger 2012). 
5 For example, in the case of a proposed extension of the Stockholm-Arlanda railway north of the Arlanda airport 
(“the Northern Bend”), “do nothing” was not included (Hultkrantz 2000); while in the case of the rail link from 
Malmö to the Öresund bridge, no ground-surface alternative that addressed problems with the existing railroad 



















age,  regional  aspects,  infrastructure users or bystanders –  systematically benefit or  lose  from  the 
implementation. This framework also seeks to identify the impact of projects with respect to explicit 
criteria established  in  the  instructions  for  the planning process.   The  framework  includes what are 
called  the  functional  objectives  (effects  on  travellers,  transport  firms,  people  with  functional 
disabilities, pedestrians and public transport) and impact objectives (for climate and health).6 
The wider  framework  is obviously close  to a Multi Criteria Analysis  (Belton and Stewart 2002). No 
explicit  weights  are  used  for  combining  effects  from  the  different  dimensions,  and  several 
consequences may appear under two or even all three sections of the framework. Analysts have been 
unable  to  identify  any  degree  of  consistency  with  respect  to  the  impact  of  these  guidelines  for 
priorities, and it will therefore not be further discussed here.  
4. Economic valuation of cost and benefits in infrastructure planning 
This  section  provides  a  discussion  of  how  some  crucial  issues  in  the  economic  valuation  of 























colleagues,  several  European  countries  have  formalized  procedures  for  reducing  the  risk  that 
construction  costs  are  biased  downwards.  This  is  particularly  important  at  early  phases  of  the 
investment planning process since the longer a project proposal has “survived”, the more difficult it is 
to stop it from being implemented if costs turn out to be higher than originally predicted.  
One example  is  the UK  framework  for BCA which makes  it mandatory  to add an “optimism bias”8 
component  in  the  calculation of  construction  cost  (UK HM Treasury 2013). This will automatically 
increase costs and will, ceteris paribus, reduce  the chances  for projects  to pass a benefit‐cost  test. 
Another example  is Norway that has  introduced a two‐stage formal Quality Assurance (QA) process 






7 This is in stark contrast to the literature on retrospective analysis of the cost of environmental regulations in the 
US, where it is found that ex ante costs were overestimated or unbiased (Kopits et al. 2014, Morgan et al. 2014, 
Morgan and Simon 2014, Simpson 2014, Wolverton 2014, Morgenstern 2017). 
8 This term has been established by its use in the UK Green Book supplement. However, this analogy to a 
psychological phenomenon should not be taken to infer a similar explanation.  




















seems  to be overly optimistic ex ante estimates of  the quality of soil or  rock. The analysis did not 
account for the fact that the decision to implement each project, and the cost estimate at that time, is 
taken several years before tendering construction. The previous references to work by Bent Flyvbjerg 




















large  the MCPF  is,  (2)  that MCPF  is normally not  considered when  evaluating other public  sector 
















11 HEATCO (Harmonised European Approaches for Transport Costing and project assessment) was a project 
funded by EU under the 6th RTD Framework program for establishing a “set of harmonized guidelines for 
project assessment and transport costing on the EU level”, see https://trimis.ec.europa.eu/project/developing-
harmonised-european-approaches-transport-costing-and-project-assessment. 
12 With a numerical general-equilibrium framework that includes a model of all taxes in Sweden, including 
among others income and value-added taxes, Birch Sörensen (2010) estimates MCPF at 1.32 for a proportional 
increase of the income tax on labor. This tax was considered as the most relevant for the assessment of the 
MCPF for transportation infrastructure investments based on projections made in 2009 (Borg 2009). These 
predicted that local and regional governments would need to substantially increase their (proportional) taxes on 
income up to 2030. The financial pressure on these government levels can to some degree be mitigated by 
transfers from the national government over the municipality income equalization system. This therefore 
provides a link between the expenditure needs of the central government, for instance for spending on national 
transportation infrastructure investments, and the local income tax rates. 
13 The NPV ratio is the standard measure used for prioritizing projects within a given budget. It is defined as the 
net present value of all benefits and costs (including investment costs), divided by the investment cost. Using this 
ratio for selecting projects implies maximization of NPV in a multi-period linear framework in which there is a 
binding budget constraint only in the first period (when investment cost is taken), not in subsequent periods 






have  a NPV  ratio  above  zero.15 Based on  the  same  logic,  if  construction  costs  for  all projects  are 





A  crucial  issue  in BCA  in  transport  is  to  value  time  savings,  traffic‐safety  enhancement  and other 
benefits from improving roads and railways that are not priced in markets. Two main approaches are 
available. Revealed preference  (RP) methods are based on observational data,  so  this approach  is 
limited to cases where such data are available. RP studies are also constrained by the methodological 
problems  that  often  arise with  such  data,  such  as  omitted  variable  bias  and multicollinearity.    In 
transport, common applications include the elicitation of the value of travel time, reduced number of 
fatalities and injuries and traffic‐noise reduction. 
The alternative approach  is  to use stated preference  (SP) methods. These are based on data  from 
hypothetical market scenarios constructed by the analyst that can be designed to value all sorts of 
benefits and  costs and  controlling  for various possible confounders.16 However,  since  respondents 
make choices from hypothetical alternatives, these methods are subject to challenges with respect to 









14 Notice that the MCPF is estimated in a model that includes value-added taxes. See also Lundholm (2008) for a 
formal analysis. 
15 Under the assumption that all projects are solely financed by public taxes. 
16 The two dominating SP methods to elicit monetary preference estimates are the contingent valuation method 








main  vehicle  for eliciting  value of  travel  time  savings  (VTTS)  in  Sweden,  in particular  in  two  large 
national studies in 1994 (Algers et al. 1995, Hultkrantz et al. 1996, Hultkrantz and Mortazavi 2001) and 
in 2007‐2008  (Börjesson et al. 2012, Börjesson and Eliasson 2014). Likewise, for the value of traffic‐





criticism  triggered  by  the  discussions  following  the  NOAAA  (National  Oceanic  and  Atmospheric  
Administration)  panel  recommendations  in  1993  after  the  Exxon  Valdez  accident  (NOAA  1993). 
Subsequent evidence has indicated serious internal and external validity problems, e.g. hypothetical 
bias, inconsistency in actual and stated behavior, as well as scope insensitivity (for instance in relation 






national  VTTS  studies  apply  the  so  called  “referencing”  approach,  where  hypothetical  choice 




Asplund  and  Eliasson  (2016)  demonstrate  that  the  ranking  of  investment  objects  in  the  national 
                                                            
17 The approach involved deriving the VSL from the VTTS based on the trade-off between travel time and 
safety. 
18  An example of a Swedish study using the RP approach to value safety is Andersson (2005) in which the 
hedonic regression method was used on the car market to elicit individual safety preferences. 













   US Sweden Norway 
Value of Statistical Life ($)  9 600 000 3 098 800 4 589 000 
Value  of  Time  ($  per  hour) 
Local travel 
 
Personal/Commuting  13.60 11.3 12.9 






















20 For those not familiar with the VSL concept Hammitt and Robinson (2011) in this journal provides a good 
introduction. 
21 This statement refers to the value used by the US Department of Transportation. The U.S. Environmental 





for  the  latter value differences may be  the differences of  the  income  tax wedges, as  the value of 
personal travel reflects the wage level after tax while business travel time is valued with wage before 
tax. However, while the value of personal travel  is differentiated between  local travel and  intercity 
travel in Norway and the US, it is not so in Sweden. There is no obvious explanation for this difference. 
The  table  indicates  significant  differences  in  the  recommended  value  of  greenhouse  gas  (CO2) 
emissions  with  twice  as  high  values  in  Sweden  and  Norway.  The  European  Commission  (2014) 
recommendation corresponds to a central value of 36 USD/ton for 2015 with an interval between 15 
and 60 USD/ton. From an economic perspective this variation is problematic as a common value on 
global  emissions  could  be  expected.  However,  the  high  CO2  values  in  Sweden  and  Norway  have 






or  implicitly,  discounting  addresses  a  complex  set of  interrelated  aspects,  involving  intertemporal 











22 While the risk of, for instance, a road construction project is related to realized versus projected benefits and 
costs of specific projects, macroeconomic risk is related to realized versus projected macroeconomic growth. 
Project risk can to some extent be diversified away by pooling individual projects, so the discussion on risk-
adjusted discount rates, see below, refers to the remaining non-diversifiable, or systematic, risk. Macroeconomic 
risk can affect the discount rate in two ways. First, the extent of project risk that cannot be diversified depends 
on the covariance between project and macroeconomic outcomes. Second, according to the precautionary 
savings literature (e.g., Gollier 2008, Gollier 2011) some “overinvestment” (i.e., lowering of the discount rate) is 




time  preference  (utility  discounting),  possibly  including  cross‐generational  preferences,  and  the 
diminishing marginal  utility  of  consumption  due  to  income  growth  (consumption  discounting),  as 




















rate,  the  risk‐free  rate  plus  one  percent,  for  some  category  of  “less  risky  investments”,  and  new 





23 For a modern treatment see e.g. Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Ch. 2). Notice that the standard Ramsey rule 
refers to deterministic, or expected, consumption growth. Gollier (2008) derives an augmented Ramsey rule for 
stochastic consumption growth that implies a (slowly) declining rate (Gollier 2011), in support of the 
precautionary savings argument. The Ramsey rule is sometimes called the Social Rate of Time Preference or 
normative approach to the social rate of discount in contrast to opportunity cost, which is called the descriptive 
or positive approach. 
24 It is also advocated by HEATCO (2006) and the European Commission (2014). 




an empirical analysis of  rail and  road  transportation data  for Sweden, Hultkrantz et al.  (2014) and 
Mantalos and Hultkrantz (2018) show, however, that – since transport  investment and GDP are co‐
integrated time‐series variables – the returns from transportation  infrastructure  investments, at an 




























26 Sweden includes all benefits based on WTP assessments, which therefore includes also benefits from 







however,  ample  room  for  Trafikverket  to  affect  priorities. One means  for  affecting  the  outcome 
emanates from the choice of which out of typically multiple design alternatives that  is chosen. The 
selection of objects  for  the proposal  to  the government provides another means  for affecting  the 
outcome.  
The  extent  to  which  results  of  BCA  actually  affect  the  final  outcome  of  this  process  has  been 
investigated in several studies. Nilsson (1991) analyzed the ranking of investment projects in the 1985 




higher  probability  of  being  included  in  the  2010‐2021  program.  This  relationship  was,  however, 






In an extension of  that  study, Eliasson et al.  (2015)  compare  the  influence of BCA  in  the  Swedish 
planning of road investments for the same period with that of Norway, which has a similar planning 
process,  for  the  period  2014‐2023.  Splitting  decisions  into  those  made  by  the  respective 
administrations  and  those  made  by  politicians,  they  found  that  in  Sweden,  the  administration´s 
decisions were affected by projects’ NPV ratios, i.e. a higher rate‐of‐return increased the chance of a 
high  ranking. The  administration  attained 61 percent of  the potential welfare  gains  that  a  strictly 
benefit‐maximizing decision‐maker would have attained  (a measure of  selection efficiency) over a 

















Another  recurrent  aspect of  the prioritization process was  first demonstrated by Hultkrantz  et  al. 
(1997).  They  established  that  the  government  tended  to  (force)  mega‐size  projects  through  the 
parliament on a  special  track aside  from  the  regular evaluation process. The absence of economic 
assessment of these mega‐projects was subsequently criticized by the Parliament Audit (2000) and 
both  the parliament´s permanent committee  for  transport and communication and  the ministry of 
finance indicated that BCA should play a more prominent role in the planning process. 






Norway’s  local  communities have  strong power  in  the planning process  for  several  reasons:    The 
Planning and Building act gives  local politicians decision power30; many projects are co‐financed by 
local  toll‐road  companies;  and  regional  equity  aspects  has  traditionally  a  strong  standing  on  the 




28 The strong district policy of Norway is part of the reason that the country has stayed out of EU membership, 
and especially the common agricultural and fisheries policies. 
29 Note that the corresponding agency for railways was not established until 1988; before that time, all priorities 
with respect to spending on railway infrastructure was internal to the national railway monopoly. 
30 Local politicians must finally approve the local plan and can thus gamble by demanding an “improved” project 
against the risk of losing the whole project. Norwegian national politicians are today more and more in favor of 











































are  an  input. One  Swedish  feature  of  transport  sector  decision‐making  is  that  the  BCA model  is 
administered by one of  the  country’s government  administrations and  that  the ultimate decision‐
makers,  the  central  government,  except  at  grand  speeches, has  a  hands‐off  attitude  towards  the 
model. 
The paper has  reviewed  the gradual  introduction of BCA as a means  for prioritizing  infrastructure 
improvement projects competing for a common state budget. Prioritization was initially delegated to 
road‐administration  bureaucrats  and  the  BCA  provided  a  degree  of  transparency  in  their  choices 
between investments. As part of an increasingly politicized prioritization process, the role of BCA came 
to have a profound  legal  status.   Rather  than producing an overt power  struggle  for  funds,  it was 
tolerated as a means for handling conflicts of  interest. Prioritization  in the most recent  investment 
programs has  less  to do with  the estimation of project benefits and costs and  is rather an opaque 
means for political “horse‐trading” (or dealing). The prime role of BCA today  is therefore again as a 
transparency  instrument  and  a  means  for  questioning  the  merits  of  grand  road  and  railway 
improvements. While the structure of BCA is well known and accepted by economists, it is questioned 
by  some  other  scholars  and most  of  all  by  interest‐group  representatives  that  have  their  pet,  or 
favorite, projects questioned.   









The methodological  challenges  in  the  valuation of  various non‐market benefits  are  inevitable  and 
require  regular updating  inter alia  to handle  the  consequences of  rising  real  incomes and gradual 
preference‐changes. Moreover, the environmental consequences of traffic and transport are getting 






externalities  is of secondary relevance  to the use of BCA  for  investment prioritization at  large. The 
trend towards vehicles that do not rely on combustion engines is further strengthening this position. 
For Sweden, the single biggest concern is the systematic downward bias of construction cost estimates. 
While  this  is unrelated  to BCA as a method,  it has a huge  impact on  the outcome of  the planning 
process.  Moreover,  the  country’s  political  process  has  a  strong  forward‐looking  emphasis.  Since 
historic spending on infrastructure is unchangeable and since it is the use of resources for the future 
that may make a difference for generations to come, future orientation is appropriate. But, there are 
still  lessons  to  learn  from  history.  By  increasing  interest  in  outcomes  and  what  has  driven  cost 
increases, important lessons for the design of new activities can be learned. 
The validity of economic appraisals as a basis for policy making is frequently questioned and the most 
common  domestic  criticism  is  that  BCA  results  underestimate  project  benefits.  To  a  degree,  this 










tradeoffs  in  a  complex world  that may be difficult  to discern  for non‐specialists. This  capability  is 
particularly  important  since many projects have both positive and negative  consequences and  the 
systematic treatment of goal conflicts is an important quality and contribution of BCA and economics.  
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